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Abstract: 
In this study, we perform a quantitative assessment of the role of money as an indicator 
variable for monetary policy in the euro area. We document the magnitude of revisions to 
euro area-wide data on output, prices, and money, and find that monetary aggregates have a 
potentially significant role in providing information about current real output. We then 
proceed to analyze the information content of money in a forward-looking model in which 
monetary policy is optimally determined subject to incomplete information about the true 
state of the economy. We show that monetary aggregates may have substantial information 
content in an environment with high variability of output measurement errors, low variability 
of money demand shocks, and a strong contemporaneous linkage between money demand and 
real output. As a practical matter, however, we conclude that money has fairly limited 
information content as an indicator of contemporaneous aggregate demand in the euro area.  
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Many macroeconomic time series are subject to substantial revisions, and hence such data
only provide imperfect information about the true state of the economy at a given point in
time. In light of these data limitations monetary policymakers and researchers alike have
long been interested in identifying indicator variables that provide precise and timely infor-
mation. At least since the early 1970s, research on the information content of alternative
indicators has highlighted the potential usefulness of monetary aggregates; these evalu-
ations have typically been conducted in reduced-form models and models with adaptive
expectations.1 More recently, research on Taylor-style interest rate rules has re-emphasized
the importance of “real-time” data uncertainty for the design of monetary policy albeit
without considering money’s potential role as an information variable.2
In this study, we perform a quantitative assessment of the role of money as an indicator
variable for monetary policy in the euro area. We begin by analyzing the sequence of
revisions to euro area-wide data, and ﬁnd that measures of real output have been subject
to substantial revisions over a period of up to nine months, whereas measures of prices and
money have generally been subject to relatively minor revisions that occur within a short
period of the initial data release. Given this pattern of euro area data revisions, monetary
aggregates have a potentially signiﬁcant role in providing information about the current
level of aggregate demand and hence about incipient pressures on the inﬂation rate.
We then proceed to analyze the information content of money in a forward-looking
model in which money has no causal role in inﬂuencing output or inﬂation.3 In particular,
1Examples of this line of research include Kareken et al. (1973), Friedman (1975, 1990), Tinsley et al.
(1980) and Angeloni et al. (1994).
2In particular, a number of studies with U.S. data have found that uncertainty arising from revisions of
output gap and inﬂation measurements may lead to a signiﬁcant deterioration in the performance of such
interest rate rules; see Orphanides (1998), Orphanides et al. (2000) and Rudebusch (2000). For a large-scale
analysis of the diﬀerences between alternative vintages of U.S. macroeconomic data the reader is referred to
Croushore and Stark (1999).
3That is, the short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy, and the money stock
does not enter directly into any of the behavioral equations. These assumptions are typical of the current
generation of macroeconomic models, including small stylized models (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997);
Fuhrer (1997); Orphanides and Wieland (1998)) as well as large-scale policy models such as the Federal
Reserve Board’s FRB/US model (cf. Brayton and Tinsley (1996)), the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (cf. Fagan
1our analysis builds on the rational expectations model of the euro area developed by Coenen
and Wieland (2000); we augment this model with a calibrated speciﬁcation for the output
revision process, and with the estimated M3 demand equation of Coenen and Vega (2001),
which was found to provide a remarkably stable representation of euro area money demand.
We assume that the central bank optimally sets the short-term nominal interest rate to
minimize a weighted average of inﬂation volatility and output gap volatility, subject to a
small penalty on nominal interest rate movements. We further assume that the central
bank and private agents share the same information set and utilize the Kalman ﬁlter to
make optimal inferences about the true state of the economy (cf. Pearlman et al. (1986),
Svensson and Woodford (2000)).4
Money can serve as a potentially useful indicator variable in our framework, because
we assume that aggregate money demand depends on the true level of aggregate output,
whereas the central bank and private agents only receive a noisy measure of aggregate
output. The rationale behind this assumption is that individual agents’ demand for real
balances depends on the true level of their individual incomes and the sum of these demands
ought to be related to the aggregated actual income. On the other hand, money demand
also ﬂuctuates in response to unobserved velocity disturbances that attenuate the strength
of its linkage to aggregate demand. Thus, the information content of money depends on
the relative variances of output mismeasurements and money demand shocks, and on the
strength of the contemporaneous linkage between money demand and real output. We
assess the value of this information in terms of the improvement in the policymaker’s loss
function and in terms of several statistical measures used in the earlier literature, namely,
et al. (2001)), and the multi-country model of Taylor (1993a). An alternative approach, which allows for
direct eﬀects of money on inﬂation, would be the P
∗ model of Hallman et al. (1991) estimated more recently
for Germany by T¨ odter and Reimers (1994) and for the euro area by Gerlach and Svensson (2000). For
analysis of this issue in models with explicit microeconomic foundations, see Ireland (2001), McCallum
(2001) and Leahy (2001).
4In contrast, Dotsey and Hornstein (2000) studied the role of money as an indicator variable in a calibrated
model of the U.S. economy with simple measurement error, under the assumption that the true state of the
economy is observed by private agents but not by the central bank. It should also be noted that their
analysis focused primarily on impulse response functions rather than on measures of the information content
of money.
2the root mean-squared prediction error (RMSE), the coeﬃcient of determination (R2), and
the entropy of the system. Finally, since money has no causal role in the model, one
may view our results as providing a reasonable lower bound on the extent to which money
provides information about contemporaneous real output.
While the information value of money could also be analyzed in an atheoretical fore-
casting model,5 such a model would not allow us to separate the potential roles of money
for monetary policy and consider exclusively the information role motivated by data uncer-
tainty. In the structural model we can exclude the possibility of a direct causal role of money
due to real-balance eﬀects or a direct eﬀect on inﬂation. Furthermore, the structural model
distinguishes dynamics due to expectations from those due to policy or adjustment dynam-
ics due to lags of endogenous variables. Finally, it allows us to derive optimal monetary
policy and evaluate the information gains in terms of the central bank’s loss function.
Our framework demonstrates that monetary aggregates may have substantial infor-
mation content in an environment with high variability of output mismeasurements, low
variability of money demand shocks, and a strong contemporaneous link between money
and output. As a practical matter, however, we ﬁnd that money has fairly limited informa-
tion content as an indicator of current aggregate demand in the euro area, mainly because
the contemporaneous link between M3 and real output is relatively weak. Of course, these
results do not rule out other motivations for careful monitoring of monetary aggregates.
For example, the prominent role for money in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy that is
signalled by the announcement of a reference value for the growth rate of M3 is motivated
by the usefuleness of money as an indicator of potential risks to the medium-term inﬂation
outlook.6 Thus, its role under the ﬁrst pillar of the ECB’s strategy is quite diﬀerent from
the potential information value regarding uncertain current output explored in this paper.
Finally, it should be emphasized that our analysis focuses solely on uncertainty regarding
5See, for example, the working paper version Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2001) for results based on a
VAR model.
6See, for instance, Nicoletti-Altimari (2001) who compares the performance of various indicators derived
from monetary aggregates to the performance of alternative indicators based on economic and ﬁnancial data
such as output growth, the output gap, the unemployment rate and interest rate spreads.
3actual output, and does not address the problem of estimating potential output. While
uncertainty about potential output has important consequences for the determination of
monetary policy, we neglect this issue here because the money stock is related to actual
output via money demand and thus cannot serve as a direct source of information regarding
potential output.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the tim-
ing and magnitude of revisions to euro area data on aggregate output, prices, and money.
Section 3 outlines the behavioral equations of the model, and indicates alternative represen-
tations of the output revision process. Section 4 describes our methodology for determining
the optimal ﬁltering weights and for evaluating the information content of indicator vari-
ables. Section 5 considers the model without money in order to quantify the magnitude of
the information problem associated with real-time output mismeasurement. Section 6 adds
a highly stylized money demand equation to the model, facilitating a systematic analysis
of how the information content of money is aﬀected by the relative variability of output
measurement errors and money demand shocks. In light of these ﬁndings, Section 7 uses
the complete model described above to evaluate the quantitative signiﬁcance of money as
an indicator variable for monetary policy in the euro area. Finally, Section 8 summarizes
our conclusions and suggests several directions for future research.
2 Data Uncertainty in the Euro Area
Some macroeconomic data series, such as nominal interest rates, exchange rates, and raw
materials prices, are readily available and not subject to revision. In contrast, indicators
of aggregate quantities and prices are more diﬃcult to construct, and are frequently sub-
ject to substantial revisions as additional information becomes available to the statistical
agency.8 For the euro area, aggregate data has only become available fairly recently (with
7For the implications of uncertainty about output gaps and potential output (or unemployment gaps and
the NAIRU) for monetary policy we refer the reader to Ehrmann and Smets (2000), Orphanides (2000) and
Wieland (1998) among others.
8Further revisions occur on a less frequent basis as the result of deﬁnitional changes, such as switching
to a diﬀerent benchmark year for the national income accounts. Such revisions often shift the entire level of
4the harmonization of statistical procedures across the individual member countries), and
hence the record of initial releases and revisions is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, it is
useful to characterize the properties of these revisions in order to shed some light on the
degree of data uncertainty in the euro area.
Thus, we proceed to analyze the timing and magnitude of revisions to euro area output,
price, and money data, beginning with the advent of European Monetary Union in 1999.
As measures of real output, we consider monthly data on industrial production (excluding
construction) as well as quarterly data on real GDP. To measure aggregate prices, we
consider monthly data on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and quarterly
data on the GDP price deﬂator. Finally, we consider monthly data for M3; we focus on this
measure of money because Coenen and Vega (2001) found that the demand function for M3
has been remarkably stable. In each case, we utilize real-time data series over the period
October 1998 through December 2000, as published in consecutive issues of the European
Central Bank’s Monthly Bulletin over the period January 1999 through February 2001.9
The nature of the revision process is best understood with an example. Figure 1 shows
monthly revisions of industrial production at the start of monetary union. Estimates of euro
area industrial production in January and February 1999, for instance, were ﬁrst published
in the May 1999 issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin. The estimates of the index reported in
May were 108.6 and 108.2 for January and February industrial output, respectively. Over
the following months the statistical authorities revised these estimates upwards. Revisions
only ceased by the end of the year. The magnitude of the revisions over this period was
0.7 in both cases. Clearly, these revisions suggest a signiﬁcant degree of data uncertainty,
which persisted for some time.
Table 1 provides summary statistics regarding the revision process for monthly euro
a data series, but may have relatively minor implications for the determination of monetary policy.
9The ECB’s monthly bulletin is a convenient source for obtaining consistent real-time data. Furthermore,
each bulletin represents a reasonably accurate summary of the data available to the ECB Governing Council
at its ﬁrst meeting each month: the cut-oﬀ date for inclusion in the bulletin predates each meeting, and
the bulletin itself is published a week later. However, in future work it would be interesting to analyze the
timing of revisions as published by the statistical agency that actually compiles each data series.
5Figure 1: Revisions to Industrial Production
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area data. The ﬁrst column is associated with the ﬁrst revision (one month after the initial
publication), the next column reﬂects the second revision (i.e., the diﬀerence between the
values published one month and two months following the ﬁrst publication), and so on until
the revision in the tenth month following initial publication. For each series, the ﬁrst row
indicates the largest upward revision at each interval (as a percent of the value published
in the previous month), while the second row indicates the largest downward revision, and
the third row indicates the mean absolute revision.
Evidently, the industrial production data are subject to substantial and frequent revi-
sions over the ﬁrst year after the initial publication. For example, the ﬁrst monthly revision
of this series has a mean absolute value of 0.34 percent, with a maximum upward revision
of 0.93 percent and a maximum downward revision of 0.6 percent. While the magnitude of
revisions gradually declines as time passes, revisions exceeding 0.1 percent are not unusual
during each of the next few months after the initial publication.
In contrast, the consumer price data are typically not revised at all; the only exceptions
are apparently due to corrections of reporting errors. Clearly, the lack of revisions does
not imply that these data provide an exact measure of aggregate inﬂation. However, mea-
6Table 1: Monthly Euro Area Data Revisions (in Percent)
Month after
123456789
initial publication
Industrial Production(a)
largest upward revision 0.93 0.81 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.18
largest downward revision -0.60 -0.46 -0.55 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.36
mean absolute revision 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
Consumer Prices(b)
l a r g e s t u p w a r d r e v i s i o n 00 0000000
largest downward revision -0.10 -0.10 0000000
mean absolute revision 0.03 0.02 0000000
M3(c)
largest upward revision 0.37 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.03
largest downward revision -0.18 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02
mean absolute revision 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999 to February 2001.
Note:
(a) Index of Industrial Production (excluding construction), seasonally adjusted.
(b) Harmonized
Index of Consumer Prices, Dec. 1998 = 100, not seasonally adjusted.
(c) M3 Index, Dec. 1998 = 100,
seasonally adjusted; calculated from monthly diﬀerences in levels adjusted for reclassiﬁcations, other reval-
uations, exchange rate variations etc..
surement biases in the consumer price index have mainly been identiﬁed with longer-term
factors (such as improving product quality, introduction of new goods and services, and
changes in expenditure shares), and hence these biases may not be crucial in evaluating
higher-frequency ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate. In any case, as we will see below, the
GDP price deﬂator (which is less susceptible to measurement bias than the HICP) also
exhibits relatively small revisions.
Finally, the magnitude of initial data revisions is substantially smaller for M3 than for
industrial output: the maximum upward and downward revisions in the ﬁrst month are
less than half as large (in percentage terms). Furthermore, subsequent revisions in M3 are
7relatively small and infrequent, so that the mean absolute revision never exceeds 0.1 percent
from the second month onwards.
Table 2 reports summary statistics regarding the revision process for real GDP and the
GDP price deﬂator, which are available on a quarterly basis. These statistics indicate that
real GDP is subject to fairly large revisions.10 For example, in the ﬁrst revision (one quarter
after the initial publication), the maximum upward revision exceeds a full percentage point,
and the mean absolute revision is about 0.8 percent of the previously published value.
Even three quarters after the initial publication, the mean absolute revision of real GDP is
about 0.5 percent. In contrast, revisions of the GDP deﬂator are much smaller: the mean
absolute revision is only about 0.1 percent in each of the ﬁrst two quarters after the initial
publication, and subsequent revisions are negligible in magnitude. Evidently, revisions to
nominal GDP for the euro area are primarily due to revisions regarding real output rather
than prices.
Thus, the monthly and quarterly data yield remarkably similar conclusions regarding
real-time data uncertainty in the euro area. Industrial production and real GDP are each
subject to relatively large revisions during the ﬁrst several quarters after the initial pub-
lication, indicating that data uncertainty regarding the current level of real output is a
non-trivial issue for the euro area.11 By comparison, both measures of aggregate prices (the
HICP and the GDP price deﬂator) and the broad money stock (M3) are subject to rela-
tively small revisions during the ﬁrst quarter after the initial publication, and to negligible
revisions in subsequent quarters.
These results raise the possibility that money can serve as a useful indicator in providing
real-time information about ﬂuctuations in real output. An additional advantage of money
10Some of these revisions have occurred as individual member countries have moved to the ESA95 har-
monization of national income accounts and are likely to become smaller as the implementation process is
completed in most countries.
11Revisions of the growth rate of real output tend to be smaller. As discussed in the ECB’s monthly
bulletin of August 2001 (see pages 26-28) the average size of revisions of quarter-on-quarter growth since the
ﬁrst quarter of 1999 was 0.2 percentage points. Throughout this paper, however, we continue to focus on the
level rather than the growth rate, because in our view, the level of output relative to the economy’s potential
is more relevant for determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy and its eﬀect on inﬂation than
the diﬀerence between actual and potential growth rates.
8Table 2: Quarterly Euro Area Data Revisions (in Percent)
Quarter after
12345
initial publication
Real GDP(a)
largest upward revision 1.49 1.21 1.14 0.20 0.19
largest downward revision -0.91 -0.95 0 -0.02 -0.08
mean absolute revision 0.80 0.69 0.47 0.11 0.14
GDP Price Deﬂator(b)
largest upward revision 0.28 0.38 0.09 0.09 0.09
largest downward revision -0.10 -0.09 0 -0.09 0
mean absolute revision 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.05
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999 to February 2001.
Note: (a) Seasonally adjusted.(b) Seasonally adjusted.
as an indicator variable is that money data typically becomes available earlier than output
data.12 In the following analysis we will primarily focus on the information gain from money
in the presence of measurement error, but we will return to the gains arising from the earlier
availability of money in the sensitivity analysis at the end of the paper.
3 A Rational-Expectations Model with Data Uncertainty
To quantify the information content of money, we utilize the euro area macroeconomic
model of Coenen and Wieland (2000), augmented by the estimated M3 demand equation
of Coenen and Vega (2001). Since these equations are speciﬁed at a quarterly frequency, it
seems reasonable to assume (in light of the results of the previous section) that observations
on aggregate output are subject to measurement error, while aggregate prices, money, and
12This holds even for monthly data. For example, in June one learns about money growth and inﬂation
in May but about industrial production in April.
9nominal interest rates are observed without measurement error.13 It also seems reasonable
to assume that the money demand of each individual household or ﬁrm depends on its
own income and expenditures (which are known to that household or ﬁrm), while neither
private agents nor the central bank observe the true level of aggregate output. Under these
assumptions, aggregate money demand will be related to the true level of aggregate income,
and hence observations on the money stock can provide useful information about movements
in aggregate output.
3.1 The Behavioral Equations
The behavioral equations of the model are indicated in Table 3.14 As shown in equation
(M-1), the aggregate price level pt is determined as a weighted average of overlapping
nominal wage contracts signed over the past year. The estimated weighting scheme implies
that a weight of 0.32 is placed on the current wage contract wt, while smaller weights are
placed on earlier contracts (e.g., wt−3 receives a weight of about 0.18).
The determination of nominal wage contracts is given in equation (M-2). As in Taylor
(1980, 1993a), each wage contract is determined by expectations about aggregate prices and
perceived output gaps over the duration of the contract.15 The expectations operator Et[.]
indicates the optimal projection of each variable, conditional on all information available at
period t. As noted above, this information set includes the true values of aggregate wages,
prices, and interest rates, and noisy observations regarding aggregate output. Since our
analysis is focused on the implications of data uncertainty regarding actual output qt,w e
assume for simplicity that potential output q∗
t is exogenously determined and known by
13In the model considered here, measurement errors of the money stock would have the same eﬀect as
money demand shocks in reducing the information content of money as an indicator of aggregate output.
Thus, one could always capture the eﬀect of money measurement error by considering a slightly higher
variance of the money demand shocks.
14Wages, prices, output, and money are expressed in logarithmic form, and interest rates are expressed at
annualized rates.
15Coenen and Wieland (2000) also considered relative real wage contract speciﬁcations of the type orig-
inally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and later studied by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). We have
performed sensitivity analysis and found that the results reported here concerning the information role of
money are not substantially aﬀected by using a relative real wage contract speciﬁcation instead of equation
(M-2).
10Table 3: A Rational-Expectations Model with Data Uncertainty
Price Level pt = f0 wt + f1 wt−1 + f2 wt−2 + f3 wt−3, (M-1)
where fi =0 .25 + (1.5 − i)0.0456
Contract Wage wt =E t
3
i=0 fi pt+i +0 .0115
3
i=0 fi yt+i

+ uw
t , (M-2)
where yt = qt − q∗
t and uw
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,0.00382)
Aggregate Demand yt =1 .2029yt−1 − 0.2225yt−2 − 0.0942rl
t + ud
t, (M-3)
where ud
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,0.00582)
Money Demand ∆(m − p)t =0 .071∆2qt +0 .097(∆is
t +∆ is
t−1) (M-4)
−0.353∆il
t−1 − 1.052(∆πt +∆ πt−1)
−0.132[(m − p) − 1.125q
+0.865(il − is)+6 .048π]t−2
+um
t ,
where πt = pt − pt−1 and um
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,0.00232)
Real Interest Rate rl
t = il
t − Et

1
2(pt+8 − pt)

(M-5)
Term Structure il
t =E t

1
8
7
j=0 is
t+j

(M-6)
Note: p: aggregate price level; w: nominal contract wage; uw: contract wage shock; y: output
gap; q: output; q∗: potential output; rl: long-term real interest rate; ud: aggregate demand shock;
m: nominal money balances; is short-term nominal interest rate; il: long-term nominal interest
rate; π: one-quarter inﬂation rate; um: money demand shock.
all private agents and by the central bank.16 Finally, under these assumptions, it should
be noted that the aggregate supply disturbance uw
t is known to all agents (including the
central bank); this implication follows from our assumptions that all agents know the current
contract wage and utilize identical information in forming expectations about the variables
16In fact, equations (M-2) and (M-3) were estimated by Coenen and Wieland (2000) using “ﬁnal” data
on euro area real GDP (that is, data available at the end of 1999), and constructing the output gap by
removing a log-linear time trend. In future work, it would be interesting to reestimate these equations using
real-time output gap data. However, as the authors note, constructing a real-time output gap data series
for the period preceding EMU would be a “courageous undertaking”.
11on the right-hand side of equation (M-2).
As shown in equation (M-3), the current output gap depends on the true output gap in
each of the previous two quarters and on the ex ante long-term real interest rate, rl
t (which
is deﬁned by equation (M-5)). This speciﬁcation seems reasonable under the assumption
that each household or ﬁrm makes spending decisions based on its own directly observed
income path, and hence aggregate spending depends on the true path of aggregate income.17
Nevertheless, since the true level of aggregate output is not directly observed, the aggregate
demand shock ud
t is not in the information set of private agents or the central bank.
As indicated by equation (M-4), real money balances (m − p)t are determined by an
error correction process involving aggregate output qt, the short-term nominal interest rate
is
t, the long-term nominal interest rate il
t (deﬁned by equation (M-6)), and the one-quarter
inﬂation rate πt = pt − pt−1.18 As noted above, this money demand speciﬁcation indicates
that the money stock responds to the true level of aggregate output qt, and hence money
has a potentially useful role as an indicator variable. Of course, this role depends on the
stability of the money demand. While estimates of money demand with U.S. data have
tended to be unstable, results with German and euro area data have typically been more
encouraging.19
Two additional characteristics of equation (M-4) are crucial in determining the speciﬁc
information content of money. First, the short-run link between money and output is rel-
atively weak, with an instantaneous income elasticity of only 0.071; evidently, the money
stock would provide somewhat more information about current output if the contempora-
neous relationship between these two variables were signiﬁcantly larger. Second, the money
demand shock um
t has an estimated standard error of 0.23 percent, reﬂecting the extent to
17To the extent that individual spending decisions actually reﬂect agents’ perceptions about the aggregate
economy, then the output gap equation would need to be augmented by terms such as Et[yt−1]a n dE t[yt−2].
We have performed some preliminary analysis of such speciﬁcations, but leave further investigation to future
research. In this context, a model with more explicit microeconomic foundations that distinguishes between
macro- and micro-level uncertainty will be helpful.
18Because the inﬂation rate πt is not annualized, the corresponding coeﬃcients in equation (M-4) appear
unusually large.
19For a recent study regarding U.S. money demand and money’s usefulness for U.S. monetary policy see
Dotsey et al. (2000).
12which money balances move in response to factors other than aggregate output, inﬂation,
and nominal interest rates.
Finally, we assume that the short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of mone-
tary policy, and that the central bank sets the interest rate each period in order to minimize
the following loss function:
Lt =E t
∞ 
j=0
δj

(πt+j − π∗)2 + ω1 y2
t+j + ω2 (is
t+j − is
t+j−1)2

,
where we choose δ =0 .99, ω1 =0 .5a n dω2 =0 .1 as our baseline parameter values.
This loss function may be viewed as a reasonable benchmark representing a monetary
policymaker whose primary objective is to stabilize inﬂation around its target value, π∗,
while also seeking to maintain stable output and to avoid large shifts in the policy in-
strument. In Section 7 below we will also perform some sensitivity analysis regarding the
implications of alternative choices for the objective function weights.20
3.2 The Revision Process
In the state-space literature, a typical assumption is that each data point of a given time
series is observed just once (possibly subject to some measurement error). In contrast,
here we wish to represent a sequence of revisions to the real output data that gradually
reﬁnes the quality of each individual data point. Statistical agencies construct estimates
of variables such as industrial output or GDP based on disaggregated data from individual
ﬁrms and households.21 As more individual observations on disaggregated data are reported
to the agency, it publishes revised estimates of the aggregate variable that improve upon
the initial data release. Some aggregate series are revised many times in this manner. Since
our analysis is focused on the behavior of private agents and the central bank, we do not
explicitly model how the statistical agency determines these revisions, using new information
on disaggregated variables. Rather, we take the following general representation of a process
20See Coenen et al. (2001) for analysis of the information content of money when the policymaker follows
the simple interest rate rule of Taylor (1993b).
21In the case of the euro area our understanding is that EUROSTAT constructs euro area estimates based
on the national accounts, while national agencies collect disaggregated data.
13of successive revisions as the starting point for our analysis:
q
(t+j)
t = qt + v
(t+j)
t , (1)
Here qt indicates the true level of output at period t, and a parenthetical superscript indi-
cates the “vintage” date of a particular output measurement. Thus, q
(t)
t refers to the initial
observation of output at time t, while q
(t+j)
t is the revised estimate published at time t+j,
and v
(t+j)
t indicates the measurement error of this revised estimate.
In the existing literature, the standard approach has been to assume that each observa-
tion is subject to a measurement error that is ﬁxed once and for all at the initial publication
date; i.e., q
(t+j)
t = q
(t)
t and v
(t+j)
t = v
(t)
t for all j ≥ 0. In contrast, our analysis explicitly
recognizes that in every period the statistical agency may revise previously-published data
in light of new information. We do assume, however, that the sequence of data revisions
eventually converges to zero; thus, q
(t+j)
t converges to a “ﬁnal” measure q
(∞)
t , while the
measurement error v
(t+j)
t converges to ¯ vt ≡ v
(∞)
t .22
We start with the case in which each observation is subject to a single revision; that
is, output is measured with error contemporaneously, but its true value is published one
quarter later:
q
(t)
t = qt + v1
t
q
(t+1)
t = qt,
(2)
where v1
t is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and standard deviation σ(v1), and is
uncorrelated with the structural disturbances ud
t, uw
t ,a n dum
t . We calibrate σ(v1)=0 .97
based on the observed revisions described in Section 2. This speciﬁcation of the revision
process implies that the data published by the statistical agency in any given period t
includes an error-prone measure of contemporaneous output, q
(t)
t = qt + v1
t, and the true
value of the previous period’s output, qt−1. Thus, for this revision process, agents use the
Kalman ﬁlter in each period to construct an optimal estimate of contemporaneous output,
qt|t ≡ Et[qt].
22Thus, our analysis does not consider the implications of occasional redeﬁnitional changes in the entire
time series.
14As we have seen in Section 2, however, the data on real output are subject to a sequence
of substantial revisions for several quarters. Therefore, we also consider the following three-
period revision process, in which the “ﬁnal” measure of period-t output is published after
three quarters:
q
(t)
t = qt +¯ vt + v3
t + v2
t + v1
t
q
(t+1)
t = qt +¯ vt + v3
t + v2
t
q
(t+2)
t = qt +¯ vt + v3
t
q
(t+j)
t = qt +¯ vt for j ≥ 3,
(3)
where vt =[v1
t v2
t v3
t ]  is a vector of serially uncorrelated measurement errors with mean zero
and diagonal covariance matrix Σvv.23 We calibrate Σvv in light of the observed revisions
from Section 2; in particular, we ﬁnd that v1
t, v2
t,a n dv3
t have standard deviations of 0.97
percent, 0.77 percent, and 0.47 percent, respectively.24
Finally, it should be noted that choosing a deﬁnitive calibration for the distribution
of ¯ vt is rather diﬃcult, given the absence of concrete information about the properties
of measurement errors that still remain in the “ﬁnal” published data. Nevertheless, it is
clear that assuming a positive variance for ¯ vt would imply a higher level of noise in the
published output data, and hence would imply larger potential beneﬁts from using money
as an indicator variable (given our assumption that money demand is related to the true
level of output).
Thus, given our general intention of providing a reasonable lower bound for the infor-
mation content of money, we will proceed henceforth under the assumption that ¯ vt has
zero variance; that is, agents learn the true value of output after either a single revision
or a sequence of three revisions to the published output data. For example, in the case
of the three-period revision process, the period-t data vintage includes an initial measure
23Using the observed revisions from Section 2, we ﬁnd that the sample correlation between v
1
t and v
2
t is
negligible, while each has negative sample correlation with v
3
t; however, as shown in our earlier work (Coenen
et al. (2001)), constructing Σvv using these sample correlations does not change the results noticeably
compared with our baseline assumption of zero contemporaneous correlation between the elements of vt.
24These standard deviations were computed using the data for which revisions were available for at least
three consecutive quarters.
15of current output, q
(t)
t = qt + v3
t + v2
t + v1
t, revised measures of output for the previous
two periods, q
(t)
t−1 = qt−1 + v3
t−1 + v2
t−1 and q
(t)
t−2 = qt−2 + v3
t−2, and the “ﬁnal” published
measure of output three periods ago that equals its true value, q
(t)
t−3 = qt−3. To reﬁne the
error-prone measures of current and past output, agents utilize the Kalman ﬁlter at each
date t to determine the components qt−j|t for j =0 ,1,2,3; that is, a preliminary estimate
for the current period, two revised estimates for the previous two periods, and the ﬁnal
estimate of output three periods ago.
4 Evaluating the Role of Indicator Variables
4.1 The Optimal Filtering Problem
We obtain optimal estimates of output by applying the Kalman ﬁlter to our linear rational
expectations model of the euro area. Implicitly, we assume that the initial estimate of
output, which the statistical agency constructed from disaggregated data, can be improved
upon by synthesizing aggregate data on real as well as monetary and ﬁnancial variables
within a fully speciﬁed macroeconometric model.25 Given our assumption that private
agents and the central bank have the same information concerning aggregate variables,
we can follow the methodological approach of Svensson and Woodford (2000), henceforth
referred to as SW2000. In particular, the structural model can be expressed in the following
form:

Xt+1
˜ Ex t+1|t

= A1

Xt
xt

+ A2

Xt|t
xt|t

+ Bi t +

ut+1
0

, (4)
where Xt is a vector of predetermined variables, xt is a vector of non-predetermined vari-
ables, it is the central bank’s policy instrument, ut is a vector of serially uncorrelated shocks
with mean zero and positive semi-deﬁnite covariance matrix Σuu, and the matrices A1, A2,
B and ˜ E contain the structural parameters of the model.
25Of course, if the statistical agency were to use optimal ﬁltering to revise its data on aggregate economic
variables, the central bank and private agents could utilize the statistical agency’s data without any further
reﬁnement (see for instance Sargent (1989)). To our knowledge, EUROSTAT does not use aggregate euro
area data and macroeconomic models for optimal ﬁltering in this manner.
16In general, the policymaker and market participants do not have complete information
about all the elements of Xt nor xt, but can only directly observe the vector Zt, which is
determined as follows:
Zt = D1

Xt
xt

+ D2

Xt|t
xt|t

+ vt, (5)
where vt is a vector of serially uncorrelated measurement errors with mean zero and positive
semi-deﬁnite covariance matrix Σvv. The measurement errors vt are assumed to be uncorre-
lated with the shocks ut at all leads and lags, i.e. E[ut v 
τ] = 0 for all t and τ. The matrices
D1 and D2 are selector matrices of appropriate dimension. Here we use χτ|t =E [χτ|It ]t o
denote the rational expectation (that is, the optimal projection) of any variable χ in period
τ given information in period t. The information set in period t corresponds to
It =

Zτ,τ ≤ t;A1,A 2,B,D1,D2, ˜ E,Σuu,Σvv,δ,ω 1,ω 2,π∗

.
In our particular problem, the policymaker and the market participants only have noisy
measurements of real output, and learn the true value of output after either a single revision
or a sequence of three revisions. To make this setup conformable with the measurement
model (5), we augment the generic model (4) in the standard way by embedding current and
lagged values of the vector of output measurement errors vt in the vector of predetermined
variables Xt. In the same way, we embed vt+1 and Σvv in ut+1 and Σuu respectively. As a
consequence, the vector of measurement errors vt disappears from the observation equation
(5) and, instead, the properly redeﬁned matrix D1 picks oﬀ the current and past values of
the output measurement errors.
For the optimal monetary policy under discretion SW2000 show that the policy instru-
ment is a function of the current estimate of the predetermined variables,
it = FX t|t,
that the non-predetermined variables fulﬁll the relationship
xt = G1 Xt + G2 Xt|t
17and that the system of equations (4), (5) can be cast into state-space form without instru-
ment and non-predetermined variables,
Xt+1 = HX t + JX t|t + ut+1 (6)
Zt = LX t + MX t|t, (7)
where the matrices F, G1, G2, H, J, L and M are derived in SW2000. This transformation
of course simpliﬁes the remaining problem of forming the estimate Xt|t considerably.26
Accounting for the contemporaneous eﬀect of the estimate Xt|t on Zt, SW2000 show that
the optimal estimate of Xt can be obtained by means of a Kalman ﬁlter updating equation.
This updating equation is expressed in terms of the innovations in the transformed variables
¯ Zt = Zt − MX t|t:
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 + K ( ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1)( 8 )
= Xt|t−1 + KL(Xt − Xt|t−1). (9)
The steady-state Kalman gain matrix K is given by
K = PL  (LPL )−1,
where the matrix P is the steady-state covariance matrix of the innovations Xt − Xt|t−1
given information in period t − 1, i.e., P =C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It−1], and satisﬁes the relation
P = H

P − PL  (LPL )−1LP

H  +Σ uu. (10)
We are particularly interested in the weights on the observed indicator vector Zt under
optimal ﬁltering. While the Kalman ﬁlter estimate Xt|t is obtained in terms of the weighted
innovations in the transformed variables ¯ Zt, we can recover the optimal weights on the
observations of Zt by substituting ¯ Zt = Zt−MX t|t and ¯ Zt|t−1 = Zt|t−1−MX t|t−1 = LX t|t−1
26Having eliminated the non-predetermined variables xt, the estimation of the predetermined variables Xt
still requires solving a simultaneity problem. Simultaneity arises because the observable variables Zt depend
on the estimate of the predetermined variables Xt|t, which in turn depend on the observables used in the
estimation.
18into (8),
Xt|t =( I + KM)−1(I − KL)Xt|t−1 +( I + KM)−1KZ t.
Here we can see that the contemporaneous eﬀect of the estimate Xt|t on Zt merely
shows up in the premultiplication of the matrix (I +KM)−1. When comparing the weights
assigned to diﬀerent information variables in the subsequent analysis we will refer to the
elements of this modiﬁed Kalman gain matrix.
The evolution over time of the vector of predetermined variables Xt and its estimate Xt|t
is simultaneously determined by the transition equation (6) and the Kalman ﬁlter updating
equation (9) in combination with the prediction formula Xt|t−1 =( H + J)Xt−1|t−1 being
derived from the former equation. It is convenient to express this system of dynamic
equations more compactly as

Xt
Xt|t

=

HJ
KLH (I − KL)H + J

Xt−1
Xt−1|t−1

+

I
KL

ut.
4.2 Measures of Information Content
We evaluate the information content of indicator variables according to the extent that they
will reduce the uncertainty surrounding the estimation problem faced by the policymaker
and the market participants, and the extent to which the reduction in estimation uncertainty
improves the policymaker’s loss function.
A convenient measure of estimation uncertainty is the covariance matrix of the projection
errors of the vector Xt, given the information set It available at period t (that is, information
obtained from current and lagged values of the observed vector Zt). This covariance matrix
can be expressed as follows:
Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]=P − PL  (LPL )−1LP. (11)
For example, one element of Xt is the unobserved aggregate demand shock, ud
t,a n d
the root mean-squared error (RMSE) of estimating this shock is given by the square root
19of the corresponding diagonal element of Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]. In the subsequent analysis the
RMSE serves as our baseline measure of the estimation uncertainty surrounding the optimal
estimate Xt|t produced by the application of the Kalman ﬁlter.27
In addition to the RMSE, it is useful to consider measuring estimation uncertainty
using the concept of entropy (or “expected uncertainty”) taken from the information theory
literature. In doing so we follow Tinsley et al. (1980) who employ entropy as a formal
measure of the information content of indicator variables. To explain the basic concept
and its relationship with the coeﬃcient of determination in linear regression models, R2,
we restate the relevant general results from Tinsley et al..28
Consider two vectors χ and ξ with joint density f(χ,ξ). The joint entropy of χ and ξ is
given by
H(χ,ξ)=−E[ln(f(χ,ξ))].
The entropy or ’expected uncertainty’ of χ corresponds to
H(χ)=−E[ln(f(χ))],
where f(χ) is the marginal density of χ, and the entropy of χ given ξ corresponds to
H(χ|ξ)=−E[ln(f(χ|ξ))]
with f(χ|ξ)=f(χ,ξ)/f(ξ) denoting the conditional density of χ given ξ.S i n c e H(χ)
corresponds to the prior uncertainty associated with χ and the observation ξ may provide
additional information with f(χ|ξ) describing what is known about χ after having observed
ξ, H(χ|ξ) reﬂects the posterior uncertainty about χ given ξ. The expected information
of the observation ξ with respect to χ is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the prior
uncertainty about χ, H(χ), and the posterior uncertainty of χ given ξ, H(χ|ξ),
I(χ|ξ)=H(χ) −H (χ|ξ).
27See Coenen et al. (2001) for additional results regarding the RMSE of the optimal estimate of xt and
the RMSE of multi-step-ahead predictions of Xt and xt.
28For early uses of the concept of entropy in the economics literature see also Theil (1967).
20Using this measure of information content one can derive the expected relative informa-
tion gain associated with adding a particular indicator variable ζ to the information vector
ξ as follows:
G(χ,ξ,ζ)=[ I(χ|ξ,ζ) −I(χ|ξ)]/I(χ|ξ).
Regarding χ and ξ as jointly distributed normal with covariance matrix Σ, Tinsley et
al. show that I(χ|ξ) has a particularly simple form. In this case, using the properties of
multivariate normal distributions,
I(χ|ξ)=0 .5l n (|Σχχ|/|Σχχ − Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ|),
where Σχχ,Σ ξξ and Σχξ =Σ  
ξχ are the submatrices of Σ with appropriate dimensions and
Σχχ−Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ is the conditional covariance matrix of χ given ξ. Thus, under normality,
the measure of information content, I(χ|ξ), corresponds to the log-distance between the
determinants of the covariance matrices of the marginal and the conditional distribution
of χ.
The case of univariate χ can then be used to develop an intuitive interpretation of the
expected information content I(χ|ξ). In this case,
I(χ|ξ)=0 .5l n (σ2
χ/(σ2
χ − Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ))
=0 .5l n (1 /(1 − β Σξξβ/σ2
χ))
=0 .5l n (1 /(1 − R2
χ|ξ)),
where β is the vector of regression coeﬃcients, and R2
χ|ξ is the population coeﬃcient of
determination in the linear regression of χ on ξ.E v i d e n t l y ,
R2
χ|ξ =1 − (exp{2I(χ|ξ)})
−1 .
These measures of information content can be adapted to our euro area model with
rational expectations and data uncertainty by choosing the covariance matrix of the pre-
diction errors Xt−Xt|t−1 (given by equation (10)) as the covariance matrix of the marginal
21distribution f(χ) and the covariance matrix of the projection errors Xt − Xt|t (given by
equation (11)) as the covariance matrix of the conditional distribution f(χ|ξ).29
5 The Information Problem in the Absence of Money
In our framework, the key information problem facing the central bank is to make optimal
inferences about the aggregate demand shock, because responding promptly to this shock
helps minimize the variability of both output and inﬂation. To quantify the magnitude of
this information problem, we consider the benchmark case in which money is not included
in the information set of private agents or the central bank. In this case, the properties of
the model are invariant to the speciﬁcation of money demand, given that money plays no
causal role in the model (that is, the short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of
monetary policy, and the money stock does not enter directly into any of the behavioral
equations).
5.1 Optimal Filter Weights
Figure 2 indicates the optimal Kalman ﬁlter weights for estimating the aggregate demand
shock when money does not enter the information set. The left panel reports these weights
for the case in which the output observation is subject to a single revision, while the right
panel gives corresponding results for the case of a three-period revision process (as described
by equations (2) and (3), respectively). In each panel, we show how the weights vary as a
function of the relative magnitude of the revision process, by scaling the standard deviation
of each measurement error by the factor λ; that is, λ = 1 indicates that each standard
deviation has the calibrated value given in Section 3.2.
In the special case of no output mismeasurements (λ = 0), the aggregate demand shock
can be determined exactly using model equation (M-3), that is, ud
t = yt − 1.2029yt−1 +
0.2225yt−2 +0 .0942rl
t. With non-trivial measurement errors (λ>0), the optimal weight
on each observed variable declines in absolute value. With arbitrarily large output mis-
29See Coenen et al. (2001), Appendix B, for a more detailed discussion.
22Figure 2: Optimal Indicator Weights for Estimating the Aggregate Demand Shock
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measurements, the observed variables do not provide any information about ud
t, and the
optimal estimate is simply its unconditional mean of zero.
5.2 Impulse Response Functions
To visualize the implications of the optimal ﬁlter weights, it is useful to examine the behavior
of the economy in response to speciﬁc shocks. Figure 3 depicts the eﬀects of a single
aggregate demand shock occuring at time 0 with a magnitude of one standard deviation,
with all initial conditions set at their steady-state values. The left column of panels indicates
the path of real output and short-term nominal interest rates when the observed output
data are subject to a single revision, and the right column of panels gives corresponding
results for the case of a three-period revision process.
The aggregate demand shock immediately raises real output about 0.5 percent above
steady state (as indicated by the solid line in each upper panel). Since there are no data
mismeasurements in this experiment, the level of current output reported at time zero is
actually correct. Nevertheless, the perceptions of private agents and the central bank are
based on the optimal ﬁlter weights that reﬂect the typical pattern of revisions. Thus, as
23Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an Aggregate Demand Shock
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indicated by the dotted line in each upper panel, the perceived level of output at time zero
is only about 0.1 percent above steady state. This deviation between perceived and actual
output disappears after either one or three quarters, depending on which revision process
was used to obtain the ﬁlter weights.
Given that the rise in reported output at time zero is largely attributed to measurement
error, the optimal monetary policy only prescribes a rise of 10-15 basis points in the short-
term nominal rate (as indicated by the solid line in each lower panel). As the true magnitude
24of the aggregate demand shock subsequently becomes clear, short-term rates rise by an
additional 100 basis points and then return gradually towards baseline. In the initial period,
however, private agents only expect a small amount of additional tightening over the next
few quarters (as indicated by the dotted line), and hence the long-term interest rate (not
shown) only rises slightly above baseline at time zero.
Evidently, the initial misperception of the aggregate demand shock is associated with
non-trivial costs in terms of output stabilization. In particular, if the central bank immedi-
ately grasped the true magnitude of the demand shock, the short-term interest rate would
jump by 75-100 basis points at time zero (as indicated by the dashed line in each lower
panel). With a larger rise in long-term rates at time zero, the impact on real output would
be about 0.1 percent less than under either calibrated data revision process (as indicated
by the dashed line in each upper panel).
Figure 4 depicts the converse situation in which the reported level of output at time
zero is subject to measurement error while the true level of aggregate demand is unchanged.
The left column of panels shows the case in which the measurement error is corrected by
a single revision one period later, and the right column of panels depicts the case of a
three-period revision process.
In this experiment, the reported level of output at time zero contains a measurement
error of nearly a full percentage point. Under optimal ﬁltering, however, this observation
is largely downweighted, and hence the perceived level of output at time zero is only 0.2
percent above baseline. Neverthless, the optimal policy prescribes an immediate 25 basis
point rise in the short-term nominal interest rate, and private agents expect short rates
to rise further before returning gradually to baseline. With the resulting rise in long-term
rates at time zero, the true level of output actually declines below baseline. Later, when
the measurement error is corrected by the revision process, monetary policy reduces rates
a bit below baseline to nudge the economy back in the right direction. Thus, while true
output never deviates very far from steady state, the output mismeasurement shock does
cause a noticeable ﬂuctuation in short-term interest rates.
25Figure 4: Impulse Responses to an Output Mismeasurement Shock
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5.3 Quantifying the Information Problem
Finally, we quantify the information problem in terms of three measures that involve the
unconditional second moments of the model variables. The upper panels of Figure 5
indicate the RMSE and the R2 associated with estimating the current aggregate demand
shock, while the lower panel indicates the value of the policymaker’s loss function, L.I n
each panel, the solid line corresponds to the single-period revision process, while the dashed
line corresponds to the three-period revision process.
26Figure 5: Measures of the Information Problem
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Of course, with no output mismeasurement, the estimated value of ud
t has zero RMSE,
and the R2 equals unity. As the degree of output mismeasurement increases, the RMSE
rises towards the asymptote of 0.58 percent (that is, the unconditional standard deviation
of ud
t), and the R2 falls towards zero. With the calibrated data revision process (λ =1 ) ,
Figure 5 indicates that the policymaker has relatively little information about the current
aggregate demand shock; that is, the RMSE is close to 0.5 percent, while the R2 is only 25
percent.
As shown in the lower panel of Figure 5, output mismeasurement generates non-
27negligible costs in terms of higher output and inﬂation volatility, even under the optimal
monetary policy. In particular, consider the policymaker’s loss function L for the calibrated
magnitude of mismeasurements (λ = 1) compared with the case of no measurement er-
rors (λ = 0): the policymaker’s loss function is nearly 30 percent higher for the calibrated
one-period revision process, and more than 50 percent higher for the calibrated three-period
revision process. These results provide a clear rationale for investigating the extent to which
additional indicator variables such as money can serve a useful role when reported output
is subject to substantial measurement error.
6 The Potential Information Content of Money
In this section, we investigate the potential information content of money in a somewhat
stylized setting in which reported output is subject to a single revision (as speciﬁed in equa-
tion (2)), while money demand is determined by the following quantity equation (instead
of the more complicated dynamic speciﬁcation in the baseline model of Section 3):
mt − pt = qt + um
t , (12)
where the exogenous disturbance um
t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero
and standard deviation σ(um).
As discussed in Section 3, we assume that money demand evolves in response to the
true level of output, and hence can serve as a useful indicator variable. In fact, under
our assumption that aggregate prices are known by all agents, money would be a perfect
indicator of true output in the limiting case with no money demand shocks (σ(um) = 0). On
the other hand, of course, money would provide no useful additional information if output
were observed without measurement error (σ(v1) = 0). More generally, the role of money
as an indicator variable will depend on the relative volatility of money demand disturbances
and output mismeasurements.
Figure 6 indicates the optimal ﬁltering weight on each of the four variables that play
a role in estimating the current aggregate demand shock, namely, the noisy current output
28Figure 6: Optimal Filtering Weights with Money as an Indicator Variable
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t , the true value of lagged output qt−1 (which becomes known at time t), the
inﬂation rate πt, and the money growth rate µt = mt − mt−1. In each panel, the ﬁltering
weight on the speciﬁed variable is measured on the vertical axis, while the two axes in the
horizontal plane denote the standard deviations of the output measurement error σ(v1)a n d
the money demand shock σ(um), respectively.
With regard to the weights on current and lagged output and inﬂation as a function of
the output measurement error, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings for the case without money. As the
measurement error regarding output increases the weights assigned to noisy current output,
29lagged output and inﬂation decrease (in absolute terms). This is the case for any level of
the standard deviation of the money demand shock as can be seen by moving from right to
left along the dimension which corresponds to the output measurement error.
We ﬁnd that money plays an signiﬁcant role in estimating the current aggregate demand
shock if the relative magnitude of the money demand shock is not too large. The weight
assigned to money is largest in the absence of money demand shocks (that is, σ(um) = 0).
In this case, the decision maker can infer the true value of output (and consequently, the
aggregate demand shock) directly from the money growth rate, since lagged output and
inﬂation are observed exactly.
As σ(um) increases, however, the weight on money growth in the optimal estimate of
output declines. With the possibility of money demand shocks, the decision maker cannot
be sure whether a money growth observation that seems inconsistent with observed output
is an indication of a mismeasurement of actual output or of a money demand shock. While
the weight on money declines, one can see that it declines more slowly the greater the
standard deviation of the output measurement error. Finally, it is of interest to note that
a higher standard deviation of the money demand shock also reduces the absolute value of
the weights on inﬂation and lagged output.
Figure 7 quantiﬁes the information problem using the same measures as in the pre-
vious section. In particular, the top two panels show RMSE and R2 associated with the
contemporaneous estimate of the aggregate demand shock, while the lower panel indicates
the value of the policymaker’s loss function L. The RMSE is zero and R2 equals unity
along either axis in the horizontal plane, corresponding to the special cases of no output
mismeasurement (σ(v1) = 0) or no money demand shocks (σ(um) = 0). In all three panels,
the surface of the graph varies monotonically with the values of σ(v1)a n dσ(um), as long
as both standard deviations are strictly positive.
Finally, Figure 8 depicts four measures of the information content of money in esti-
mating the aggregate demand shock: the reduction in RMSE (in percent), the improvement
in R2, the expected relative gain in information G (in percent), and the reduction in the
30Figure 7: The Information Problem with Money as an Indicator Variable
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policymaker’s loss function L (in percent). When output measurement errors are relatively
large compared with money demand shocks (that is, σ(v1) > 0.5 percent and σ(um) < 0.5
percent), the improvement in the quality of the estimate can be substantial: in such cases,
money reduces the RMSE by 20 percent or more and raises the R2 by at least 0.18. The
information gain from utilizing money as an information variable is also very high under
these conditions, while the policymaker’s loss function can be reduced by as much as 25
percent.
31Figure 8: The Information Content of Money
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7 The Quantitative Signiﬁcance of Money as an Indicator
Variable
Having illustrated the role of money in a somewhat simpliﬁed model, we now proceed to
quantify the information content of money using the full model given in Section 3. In
particular, we utilize the empirical money demand equation given in model equation (M-4)
with the estimated standard deviation of the money demand shock, and we consider the
3-quarter output revision process given in equation (3) as well as the simpler 1-quarter
revision process (given by equation (2)) that was used in the previous section. We also
32consider the implications of the increased magnitude of money demand disturbances during
the period following the implementation of EMU in early 1999.
7.1 The Optimal Indicator Weights
Table 4 indicates the optimal weight on each indicator variable used in estimating the cur-
rent aggregate demand shock, ud
t, for each speciﬁcation of the output revision process. The
upper panel shows these weights when money is not included in the information set, while
the lower panel indicates the weights when current money growth is utilized in constructing
the optimal estimate. In the latter case, we consider two alternative values for the standard
deviation of money demand shocks: the estimate obtained by Coenen and Vega (2001) for
the pre-EMU period (1980:4 to 1998:4), which is equal to 0.23 percent, and the standard
deviation of one-step-ahead forecast errors associated with this money demand equation
over the more recent period (1999:1 to 2000:4), which amounts to 0.43 percent. While the
latter value is markedly higher, this may be viewed as a temporary phenomenon associated
with the initial transition to EMU.
When the revision process is completed in a single period, the previous period’s output
is known with certainty (that is, q
(t)
t−1 = qt−1). In this case, longer lags of output do not
contain any additional information regarding the period t aggregate demand shock. Thus,
as shown by the ﬁrst row of the upper panel, the optimal ﬁlter places non-zero weight on
the noisy current output observation q
(t)
t , the previous period’s output level qt−1, and the
current inﬂation rate πt.
In contrast, when the revision process takes three periods, the current and previous two
output observations contain measurement error, while the true value of qt−3 is revealed in
the latest data vintage. In this case, as indicated in the second row of the upper panel,
the optimal ﬁlter places non-zero weight on all four output observations (that is, q
(t)
t , q
(t)
t−1,
q
(t)
t−2,a n dq
(t)
t−3) as well as the current inﬂation rate.
When current money growth is included in the information set, we see that this indicator
variable receives substantial weight in estimating the current aggregate demand shock. The
33Table 4: Optimal Indicator Weights for Estimating the Aggregate Demand Shock
Revision Process q
(t)
t q
(t)
t−1 q
(t)
t−2 q
(t)
t−3 πt µt
Filtering without Money
One-Period Revision 0.275 -0.287 0 0 -0.009 —
Three-Period Revision 0.140 -0.055 -0.051 -0.020 -0.005 —
Filtering with Money
A. Pre-EMU Standard Deviation of Money Demand Shock
One-Period Revision 0.281 -0.229 0 0 0.012 0.356
Three-Period Revision 0.150 -0.042 -0.070 -0.047 0.018 0.384
B. Initial-EMU Standard Deviation of Money Demand Shock
One-Period Revision 0.277 -0.271 0 0 -0.003 0.101
Three-Period Revision 0.143 -0.051 -0.057 -0.027 0.002 0.114
precise weight depends on the speciﬁcation of the output revision process and the standard
deviation of money demand shocks, but the notable point is that the magnitude of this
weight is roughly similar to that placed on the noisy current output observation. Of course,
interpreting the speciﬁc pattern of ﬁltering weights is rather diﬃcult, and hence we now
proceed to quantify the information content of money using the measures described above.
7.2 Measures of Information Content
Table 5 characterizes the information role of money in estimating the current aggregate
demand shock under each of the two assumptions about the revision process. As a bench-
mark for comparison, the ﬁrst three columns of the table provide results for the case when
money growth is included in the information set, namely, the RMSE of the demand shock
estimate, the associated R2, and the value of the policymaker’s loss function L.E v i d e n t l y ,
the precision of the demand shock estimates is not very high, regardless of how the output
34Table 5: The Information Role of Money in the Estimated Model
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 L %∆RMSE ∆R2 %G %∆L
A. Pre-EMU Standard Deviation of Money Demand Shock
One-Period Revision 0.49 0.28 71.73 -1.17 0.02 7.72 -0.55
Three-Period Revision 0.53 0.16 85.05 -1.33 0.02 18.63 -0.46
B. Initial-EMU Standard Deviation of Money Demand Shock
One-Period Revision 0.50 0.27 72.01 -0.34 0.01 2.23 -0.16
Three-Period Revision 0.54 0.14 85.33 -0.41 0.01 5.64 -0.14
revision process is speciﬁed.
The remainder of Table 5 reveals the extent to which current money growth increases
the precision of the estimated demand shock and thereby reduces the policymaker’s loss
function compared to the situation when money is not included in the information set. In
particular, the RMSE is reduced by about 1.5 percent, while the R2 increases by about 0.02.
Measured in terms of lower entropy, the information gain G is somewhat more impressive:
about 10 to 20 percent, depending on the speciﬁcation of the output revision process.
Finally, as indicated in the last column, using money as an indicator variable reduces the
policymaker’s loss function L by about 0.5 percent.
The lower panel of Table 5 shows that these meaures of the information content of
money are markedly lower when we calibrate the standard deviation of money demand
shocks to the results for the early-EMU period. These results are completely consistent
with the ﬁndings of the previous section: for a given degree of output mismeasurement, the
information content of money shrinks with the magnitude of innovations to money demand.
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7.3 Further Sensitivity Analysis
Now we brieﬂy summarize some additional sensitivity analysis regarding the results pre-
sented above.
First, it is useful to consider the extent to which the information content of money
depends on the stabilization objectives of monetary policy. In our framework, money is
potentially useful in making inferences about the contemporaneous level of real output, but
provides no information about current inﬂation (for which the reported data is subject to
little or no revision) and negligible information regarding future inﬂation.30 Thus, in this
context money will have negligible information content in a strict inﬂation targeting regime,
but may serve as an important indicator variable for a central bank that places substantial
weight on stabilizing both output and inﬂation.
Figure 9 shows how the information content of money (as measured by %∆L) varies
30The latter point is documented in our earlier working paper; cf. Coenen et al. (2002).
36Table 6: Sensitivity to the Income Elasticity of Money Demand
Scaling Factor for the
Information Revision
Income Elasticity of Money Demand
Measure Process 12 4
%∆RMSE One-Period Revision -1.17 -4.46 -14.94
Three-Period Revision -1.33 -5.25 -16.46
∆R2 One-Period Revision 0.02 0.06 0.20
Three-Period Revision 0.02 0.09 0.26
%G One-Period Revision 7.72 29.85 105.86
Three-Period Revision 18.63 74.85 249.86
%∆L One-Period Revision -0.55 -2.07 - 6.57
Three-Period Revision -0.46 -1.23 -3.54
with the relative weight on output volatility in the objective function. As noted in Section 3,
our baseline analysis has assumed that the policymaker only places half as much weight on
output volatility compared with inﬂation volatility; in this case, the use of money as an
indicator variable reduces the loss function by about 0.5 percent. The reduction in the loss
function is somewhat greater for a policymaker who places equal weight on stabilizing both
output and inﬂation, and is negligible for a policymaker focused solely on stabilizing the
inﬂation rate.
Second, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of alternative money demand speci-
ﬁcations with a stronger contemporaneous relationship between money and output. For the
preceding analysis, we have used the demand function for M3 because this money aggregate
has exhibited reasonable stability in the euro area over the past two decades (cf. Coenen
and Vega (2001)). However, the estimated coeﬃcient that determines the instantaneous
income elasticity of M3 is rather small. Narrower money aggregates (such as M1) typi-
37Table 7: Optimal Indicator Weights when Current Output is Unobserved
Revision Process q
(t)
t q
(t)
t−1 q
(t)
t−2 q
(t)
t−3 πt µt
One-Period Revision — 0.082 0 0 0.028 0.465
Three-Period Revision — 0.026 -0.020 -0.033 0.026 0.436
cally have a much tighter relationship with current output. As shown in Table 6,w eﬁ n d
that a higher instantaneous income elasticity substantially raises the information content
of money. Thus, to the extent that monetary analysis can identify structural changes and
special factors that generate shifts in the demand function for a narrow aggregate (such
as M1), the central bank would be able to utilize such an aggregate in reducing the data
uncertainty associated with current output.
Finally, we have assumed for simplicity that private agents and the central bank are
able to utilize a noisy estimate of contemporaneous output at each point in time. Given the
actual time delays in releasing GDP data, however, it may be more realistic to assume that
no output estimate is available until the subsequent period (especially since our model is
speciﬁed at a quarterly frequency). As shown in Tables 7 and 8, the importance of using
money as an indicator variable increases in this case.
Table 8: The Information Role of Money when Current Output is Unobserved
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 L %∆RMSE ∆R2 %G %∆L
One-Period Revision 0.57 0.03 77.53 -1.58 0.03 — -0.93
Three-Period Revision 0.57 0.03 92.54 -1.49 0.03 — -0.69
Note: The measure of information content G is not well-deﬁned for the particular estimation
problem when current output is unobserved.
388 Conclusion
To explore the information role of money in the presence of data uncertainty we have ex-
tended the euro area macroeconomic model of Coenen and Wieland (2000) by incorporating
the euro area-wide money demand model of Coenen and Vega (2001) and an empirically cal-
ibrated model of the revision process of aggregate euro area output. Using this framework
we have found that money can play an important role as an information variable and may
result in major improvements in current output estimates. However, the speciﬁc nature of
this role depends on the magnitude of the output measurement error relative to the money
demand shock.
In particular, we have found noticable but small improvements in output estimates
due to the inclusion of money growth in the information set when the standard deviation of
money demand shocks equals the estimated value from Coenen and Vega (2001). Sensitivity
analyses indicate that money plays a quantitatively more important role with regard to
output estimation if the central bank assigns a high weight to output stabilization, if current
output is completely unobserved, or if the direct contemporaneous link between output and
money growth strenghtens. Of course, as the construction of euro area aggregate output
data is improved over time, the magnitude of the revisions discussed in Section 2 is likely to
decline. Nevertheless, evidence concerning U.S. data vintages collected by Croushore and
Stark (1999) indicates that data uncertainty will remain an important issue even once the
data collection technology has matured.
Throughout the paper we consider a relatively limited role of money by focusing ex-
clusively on the information content of money with respect to output measurement and by
excluding the possibility of a direct role of money in output and inﬂation determination. In
this sense, our quantitative results only indicate a lower bound on the usefulness of money.
An alternative model that allows for signiﬁcant direct eﬀects of money on inﬂation and
could be used in future research is the so-called P∗ model.
Also, as noted earlier, we have focused attention on a framework with symmetric in-
39formation regarding aggregate output data as far as private market participants and the
central bank are concerned. We have also conducted some exploratory analysis under the
assumption of asymmetric information regarding aggregate data that is used by Dotsey and
Hornstein (2000) and Svensson and Woodford (2001). However, in our view this assump-
tion is undesirable if it implies that a representative agent by knowing his individual income
can also infer aggregate income and demand while the policymaker only observes a noisy
estimate of aggregate demand. We plan to study the asymmetric case in more detail in the
future in a model that would allow us to diﬀerentiate more carefully between individual and
aggregate uncertainty.
Finally, another interesting avenue for future research would be to compare optimal
ﬁltering to simple ﬁltering rules in keeping with the recent debate on optimal versus simple
monetary policy rules. For example, one could investigate the performance of simple rules
that respond only to observed output growth, inﬂation and money growth instead of optimal
estimates of the output gap. A recent study that considers an example of a simple ﬁltering
rule in the context of NAIRU uncertainty is Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001).
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